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Introduction 
 
 It is well known that the communist economies consider information of crucial 
importance during the early stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In order to achieve the 
paradisiac final period of communal bliss, the development and control of the polity is required 
for what appears to be a number of decades.1 As a result statistics on economic matters tend to be 
restricted in these societies, and when they are published or disseminated in other fashion (like in 
speeches), they tend to be thoroughly massaged. The objective is to give the impression of 
continued success in the building of socialism, and to impress foreign investors who might be 
attracted to provide hard currency investment that may be needed by the system.  
 
 In the case of Cuba these traits have been taken to extremes, especially during the decade 
of the nineties, after the disappearance of the Soviet Bloc in 1989. In fact, that was the year in 
which the country’s statistical abstract (Anuario Estadistico de Cuba) was published by the 
government, although it has reemerged recently. The yearly reports of the Cuban central bank 
then the Banco Nacional de Cuba to its international creditors also disappeared for a while. 
Publications have resumed but they seem to be addressed to the lenders from whom Cuba is 
requesting a rescheduling of its massive debt and to foreign investors and traders. Finally, the 
1990 census was never undertaken, although the 2000 tally was not missed.  
 
 In addition, it has been shown that Cuba has been particularly prone to tergiversate the 
economic information that it publishes or spreads about, to fulfill whichever purposes it might 
have at the moment.2 And given that Cubans emphasize that it is going through a “Special 
Period”,3 which has heightened its paranoia with respect to the fragility of its economy, it can be 
expected that the mendacity of the information provided by the Island is at its high point. 
  
 A cherished exercise of international economists becomes very useful under such 
circumstances: the continuous checking of the international trade statistics depending on the 
country originating the information. In order to establish true inter-country flows it is useful to 
parse the reports of both the exporting and importing countries to insure that the statistics match. 
                                                 
1 It came to seven in the case of the Soviet Union before its demise. 
2 Consult Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, “Is the Cuban Economy Knowable?”, Caribbean Review, Spring 1986  
3 See Banco Nacional de Cuba, Economic Report, 1994, Habana, 1995, pg.3 
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Of course, care has to be exercised on the comparability of the flows being examined, as points 
of origin express their values in terms of FOB, while destinations value at CIF levels. Generally 
it is accepted that the reliability of the statistics is higher in those having the most advanced 
economic and political systems. Which leads to the placing of a higher confidence in the 
numbers obtained from the developed countries. This approach fits well the purpose of 
enlightening the black hole of Cuban foreign trade statistics, which whenever emitting some light 
waves of information has to be suspected of distorting self-interest in order to present the best 
color possible.  
 
 For the purpose at hand the recently issued publication Cuba: Handbook of Trade 
Statistics, (from now on the Handbook) published by the Directorate of Intelligence of the 
Central Intelligence Agency will be utilized. As the publication states, its purpose is to compile 
“statistics on Cuban trade…from the data of Havana’s trade partners. This Handbook provides a 
detailed substitute for the official statistics that the Cuban Government published yearly before 
1990 in its Anuario Estadistico de Cuba”.4 Given that for practically all countries in the world 
there is no interest in mal or misreporting their international trade statistics, it would seem that 
this approach would allow us a glimpse of Cuban trade relations, on which to base an analysis 
that would indirectly indicate the status of this economy. Since the Handbook was discontinued 
at the turn of the millennium, more recent data has been taken from the International Monetary 
Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
  
 At the beginning of the paper the characteristics of Cuba’s international trade flows will 
be examined, followed by its commodity composition. Finally the total numbers for exports and 
imports will be addressed, and an analysis of the Cuban economy through its external sector will 
end the foray. Generally the period covered is that of 1989 to 2002. 
 
 It should be underlined that other sources of foreign trade statistics were considered to 
verify the accuracy of the Handbook, particularly the Direction of Trade Statistics, published 
quarterly and annually by the International Monetary Fund, being the most reputable. It was 
found however that, like similar sources from other world bodies (United Nations, GATT, etc.), 
that they lacked in their reflection of trade among Cuba and the Former Soviet Union and other 
CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Not 
only did the Handbook include this information, but it was more conservative in the numbers 
attributed to Cuban trade in goods, by this meaning that the numbers are higher than those 
reported in Direction of Trade Statistics. Finally, the country shares and the trade flows are quite 
similar on both sources.  
 
 
 
Characteristics of Geographical Trade Flows 
 
                                                 
4 Refer to Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Handbook of Trade Statistics, various years, Virginia 
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 In Table 1 you shall find the total exports of goods of Cuba to different countries of the 
world by major geographic areas. Only the most important nations are depicted, for the period 
1989 to 1995. As can be seen Cuban exports imploded in between these two years. The latter 
values represent only 30 percent of the earlier. But if we consider that the US dollar (US$) has 
lost 23 percent of its value to inflation5 during this span, in real terms 1995 exports represent 
only 24 percent of the 1989 figures. 
 
 Russia is no longer the principal country of destination six years after the drastic political 
and economic realignment of the world, which led to the breakdown of the Soviet Union into 
many independent states.6 The 1989 to 1991 Russian data are not available but between 19927 
and 1995 the export of Cuban goods to that country fell by close to 70 percent in nominal terms, 
with no other country taking up the slack.  
 
 The principal market for Cuban goods became Canada, which multiplied its imports in 
current terms by a multiple of six. However, the absolute gain is from a very small base (52 US $ 
million in 1989) so that the absolute increase has been of only $182 million US $ in nominal 
terms, equivalent to $148 million US $ if discounted by price increases. The second largest taker 
of Cuban exports is the country of China. Yet, compared with 1989, the values show a slight 
decline in current terms (see Table 1). 
 
A similar depiction can be obtained from Table 2, where the value of imports of goods are 
shown. The decline in total imports has been slightly less than with exports with the former 
falling to 35 percent of its 1989 nominal values, and 28 percent in real terms. But here it is 
possible to envisage that Russia has been supplanted by Spain and Mexico as the principal 
Cuban suppliers8. There has been a diversification of imports away from the old Soviet world, 
which appears to be more drastic when contrasted with the picture that emerged for exports. This 
applies even to China, another old communist country, which has become a less significant 
supplier as well (compare Table 2).  
 
 If we look at the trade statistics reported by other countries for Cuba on which the 
Handbook is based, they appear to show that economic activity in the Island, which is closely 
tied to exports and imports9, hit rock bottom in 1993-1994 (which are practically the same in real 
terms), and to have shown a discernible rise in 1995. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This information was supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index section in Washington 
D.C. 
6 This is the reason why Russia cannot be shown in the tables in 1989. 
7 In 1992 Russia was by far the major importer of Cuban wares.  
8As recent as 1993 Russia was still the principal exporter to Cuba. 
9For evidence along these lines see Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, “Interdependence and Economic Performance in Cuba” in 
Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., Cuban Communism, Transaction Publisher, 1995 
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Table 1            
 Exports by Country of Destination, 1989-95 (in millions of US$) 
 
 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
TOTAL 
 
5392 
 
4910
 
3550
 
2030
 
1275 
 
1385 
 
1600
 
Europe 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Finland 
 
18 
 
19
 
19
 
18
 
18 
 
21 
 
N.A.
 
France 
 
61 
 
52
 
61
 
44
 
39 
 
44 
 
57
 
Germany 
 
21 
 
23
 
19
 
21
 
14 
 
25 
 
36
 
Italy 
 
45 
 
52
 
48
 
51
 
33 
 
50 
 
53
 
Netherlands 
 
26 
 
22
 
40
 
26
 
25 
 
24 
 
42
 
Portugal 
 
23 
 
19
 
18
 
27
 
35 
 
48 
 
24
 
Russia 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A.
 
N.A.
 
632
 
436 
 
301 
 
196
 
Spain 
 
91 
 
80
 
91
 
85
 
65 
 
78 
 
96
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
56 
 
54
 
32
 
23
 
13 
 
16 
 
13
 
Near 
East/Asia 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
China 
 
229 
 
306
 
202
 
183
 
74 
 
121 
 
214
 
Japan 
 
133 
 
95
 
142
 
115
 
51 
 
63 
 
89
 
Americas 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Brazil 
 
32 
 
102
 
28
 
16
 
10 
 
57 
 
N.A.
 
Canada 
 
52 
 
112
 
133
 
212
 
132 
 
142 
 
234
 
Mexico 
 
21 
 
53
 
13
 
7
 
4 
 
12 
 
6
 
Venezuela 
 
26 
 
9
 
18
 
20
 
3 
 
5 
 
2
 
Africa 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Algeria 
 
81 
 
70
 
53
 
54
 
49 
 
31 
 
N.A.
 
Libya 
 
3 
 
56
 
29
 
0
 
0 
 
0 
 
N.A.
 n.a. = Not available 
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba: Handbook of Trade Statistics, 1996,  Virginia, 1996 
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 Table 2 
 Imports by Country of Origin, 1989-95 (in millions of US$) 
 
 
 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
Total 
 
8124 
 
6745
 
3690
 
2235
 
1990 
 
2025
 
2825
 
Europe 
 
 
    
 
  
 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg 
 
35 
 
45
 
40
 
22
 
52 
 
33
 
N.A.
 
France 
 
49 
 
69
 
63
 
90
 
127 
 
133
 
148
 
Germany 
 
124 
 
100
 
123
 
59
 
40 
 
41
 
70
 
Italy 
 
81 
 
108
 
158
 
102
 
65 
 
63
 
81
 
Netherlands 
 
38 
 
38
 
36
 
42
 
55 
 
50
 
71
 
Russia 
 
N.A. 
 
N.A.
 
N.A.
 
N.A.
 
249 
 
237
 
N.A.
 
Spain 
 
216 
 
303
 
285
 
199
 
191 
 
289
 
395
 
United 
Kingdom 
 
87 
 
67
 
50
 
50
 
21 
 
40
 
30
 
Near East/ 
Asia 
 
 
    
 
  
 
China 
 
212 
 
272
 
224
 
200
 
177 
 
147
 
146
 
Japan 
 
54 
 
73
 
36
 
18
 
18 
 
24
 
19
 
Americas 
 
 
    
 
  
 
Argentina 
 
187 
 
163
 
99
 
63
 
72 
 
48
 
N.A.
 
Brazil 
 
62 
 
85
 
66
 
17
 
19 
 
25
 
N.A.
 
Canada 
 
132 
 
133
 
114
 
100
 
107 
 
84
 
200
 
Colombia 
 
27 
 
20
 
20
 
14
 
20 
 
35
 
18
 
Mexico 
 
108 
 
103
 
106
 
117
 
188 
 
269
 
353
 
Venezuela 
 
15 
 
464
 
49
 
79
 
120 
 
90
 
38
 n.a. = Not available 
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
The composition of Commerce in Goods 
 
 If attention is focused on the value of commodity exports as depicted in Table 3, it 
is clearly seen that sugar and its derivatives still account for well over one half of total 
Cuban exports, notwithstanding the crisis affecting this sector. This makes evident the 
weakness of the other export activities of Cuba. It is remarkable that after promising to 
repay Cuban loans to the European countries and Japan in the early to middle eighties on 
the strength of non-traditional exports, after about ten years these are still weak. So much 
investment in biotechnology to the detriment of other alternatives that could have brought 
relief to the basic necessities of the people, only to reap an average of 78 million US $ a 
year in the exportation of these goods between 1991 and 1995. Yet, this is the only sector 
showing expansion. After many years of hearing about Canadian investments in nickel, it 
is found that it only accounted for $220 million US $ of exports in 1995 (down from 485 
million US $ in 1989). Finally, tobacco exports have remained stagnant in value terms, 
which implies reduction in volumes given the steep rise in cigar prices. In sum, the 
composition of Cuban exports is practically unchanged since 1989, with heavy 
concentration on sugar and a primary commodity bent, in contrast with developing 
economy trends.  
 
In Table 4 the commodity composition of import values is shown. The principal 
item in this list is fuels, which represents 30 percent of the total value. The importation of 
this essential component of energy supply has shrunk to 32 percent of what it was in 
1989. It is well known how much this reduction straightjackets the performance of the 
Cuban economy, but its substantial dependence on food imports from the outside world is 
not as well understood. This is highlighted by the statistics showing that this category is 
second in importance in the Table commented, representing over 20 percent of imports. 
Of the rest, machinery represents the most crucial, since it reflects future levels of 
production. It is shocking to realize that at 360 million US $ in 1995, these essential 
import have slid dramatically, and now represent 19 percent of the level attained in 1989. 
(The same trends are shown by transport equipment, although this category partly 
represents consumption). In addition, they constitute a minuscule share of Cuban 
importation (less than 13 percent )10. As a proxy for overall investment in small open 
economies like Cuba, this bodes ill for future economic growth in the Island, which is 
devoid of a capital-goods-producing sector.  
 
Tourism and Foreign Investment 
 
 A rather desolate panorama of Cuban economic activity emerges from the trade in 
goods reported by its trading partners. The bleakness is underlined if other traits of the 
external sector of the Cuban economy are brought to bear. To wit, there has been an 
expansion in the number of tourists that have visited the Island. Even though reliable 
statistics, as have been presented here, are not available, reports from Western observers 
in Cuba and travel agents abroad, attest to a significant rise in visitors during the 1990s. 
                                                 
10 In 1989 this ratio represented close to 24 percent of total imports. 
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Yet, this activity is necessarily accompanied by an increase in imports dedicated to feed, 
house, entertain and otherwise service this enclave sector. Once account is taken of the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
 Commodity Exports, 1989-95 (in Millions of U.S.$)  
 
 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
Total 
Exports 
 
5392 
 
4910
 
3550
 
2030
 
1275
 
1375 
 
1600
 
Sugar, 
molasses, 
and honey 
 
3959 
 
3690
 
2670
 
1300
 
820
 
785 
 
890
 
Fish 
 
127 
 
125
 
115
 
120
 
90
 
110 
 
115
 
Fruit 
 
139 
 
150
 
100
 
50
 
50
 
80 
 
35
 
Tobacco 
 
85 
 
95
 
100
 
95
 
75
 
80 
 
90
 
Nickel 
 
485 
 
400
 
245
 
200
 
120
 
110 
 
220
 
Medical 
Products 
 
58 
 
130
 
50
 
50
 
20
 
110 
 
125
 
Other 
 
473 
 
320
 
270
 
235
 
100
 
110 
 
125
   
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4                             
Commodity Imports 1989-95 (in Millions of U.S.$) 
 
 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
Total Imports 
 
8124 
 
6745
 
3690
 
2235
 
1990 
 
2055
 
2825
 
Food 
 
1011 
 
840
 
720
 
450
 
490 
 
430
 
605
 
Raw materials 
 
307 
 
240
 
140
 
40
 
35 
 
25
 
90
 
Fuels 
 
2598 
 
1950
 
1240
 
835
 
750 
 
750
 
835
 
Chemical 
products 
 
530 
 
390
 
270
 
170
 
150 
 
180
 
285
 
Semi finished 
goods 
 
838 
 
700
 
425
 
195
 
180 
 
220
 
390
 
Machinery 
 
1922 
 
1790
 
615
 
350
 
235 
 
240
 
360
 
Transport 
equipment 
 
609 
 
590
 
170
 
125
 
80 
 
110
 
100
 
Consumer 
goods 
 
276 
 
225
 
90
 
50
 
50 
 
80
 
130
 
Other 
 
33 
 
20
 
20
 
20
 
20 
 
20
 
25
   
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ibid. 
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value of such imported goods, the fall of Cuban imports for internal consumption and 
production since 1989 would loom even larger.  
 
 Another claimed characteristic of the Cuban economy during the nineties is an 
increase in foreign direct investment. If this were believable, our depressing picture of a 
total collapse of the Cuban Economy would be even sorrier. Once again, no hard statistics 
are to be found on this matter, so no discounting of imports really directed to a foreign 
company enclave can be safely done11. This is supported by the statistics presented here 
showing that very little of the Cuban imports have been under the category of machinery 
and transport equipment. If anything, all indications are that Soviet Bloc direct 
investments in the Island were much higher up to the very early nineties, and have now 
virtually vanished. 
 
 The latter point portends a worsening of the future performance of the Cuban 
economy, adding to the litany of negative factors exposed in the foreign trade numbers 
during the first half of the 1990s. Even though the Tables have covered both exports and 
imports of goods, the latter have been emphasized because they provide the best indirect 
measurement of production and internal consumption in Cuba. The availability of fuels 
and foodstuffs, jointly representing over half of total importation, in addition to essential 
intermediate products, provide the most reliable estimates of what is happening to the 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the Island. 
 
 Although exports did arrest their decline in 1994, and managed an almost 16 
percent growth over the 1994 figures, they still cannot provide but on fourth of their 
foreign exchange earning power in 1989. With less room to continue financing trade 
deficits12 of over a billion US $ a year, like that experienced in 1995, it is difficult to 
envisage an upturn in imports in the near future.  
 
Policy Implications 
 
 Imports and exports of Cuba in 1995 in real terms, stand at implosion levels when 
compared with those of 198913. The Cuban level of GDP at constant prices bears a 
historical relationship particularly mimicking import trends. There is not much hope for a 
turnaround of the economy of Cuban given the evident low levels of investment, and the 
economy’s bent on yesterday’s traditional pattern of export specialization. 
 
                                                 
11 Western sources in the Island and multinational companies abroad have not confirmed the claims of 
Cuba that significant amounts of foreign direct investments have trekked in.  
12 The straits faced by Cuba in attracting foreign indirect investment flows stem from its high foreign 
indebtedness and the fact that most of it is now on default. This is why it is restricted to very short term 
suppliers credit or cooperative arrangements by Cuban export buyers, at usury like interest rates.  
13 In Fact, the importation of foreign financial services resulting from these operations are now 
countermanding the Island’s export of tourist services. Adjusting for prices and population, the 1958 Cuban 
exports should have amounted to about 9 billion US $ in 1989. (See Appendix)  
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 The window-dressing reforms of the Cuban economy are evidently not helping. 
Unless some profound changes are implemented, Cuba cannot expect to turn-around its 
economic performance and make up for the slump that has afflicted its economy since 
1989, cutting it by more than one-half14. The economy has to be increasingly privatized 
and economic freedoms and market processes instituted, before domestic and foreign 
economic agents feel secure to invest in the future. This, together with decisive trade 
liberalization, are the only roads that would lead to the Island’s participation in the sub-
contracting and partial assembly activities of the world global manufacturing factory, 
leading the country towards the increasing abandonment of its retrograde primary-
product pattern of exports.  
 
Recent Changes in Trade 
 
On Tables 5 and 6 more recent data are included on Cuban exports and imports, 
this time using data reported by The Direction of Trade Statistics. The data shows a 
momentous shift from the Soviet Bloc to Western Nations. With a fifty percent increase 
in imports and a 35% expansion on exports for the latter countries. Such expansions mask 
a major contraction on total trade for Cuba, which has been shown in previous Tables. 
Thus, they only signify a reorientation of trade. 
In fact, although total exports from the Island recovered from the very depressed 
levels of 1993, such recuperation started to reverse in 1997, and continued through 2002. 
A similar phenomenon occurred with imports, except that the decline was delayed by one 
year, starting in 1998. 
The most salient facts that can be noted from examining the trade data of Cuba’s 
most recent principal trading partners, are the expansion of exports to the Netherlands 
(basically nickel to be reexported to other nations), and to a lesser extent to Spain (during 
the cigar boom) and Russia (oil paid exports of sugar). Contractions which are relevant 
are those to China, Japan, Italy and France, in order of importance. The expansion in 
exports to Mexico might seem relevant, except when compared with 1989. 
Imports presents a quite different setting, with expansions for China, Italy, France and 
Japan, almost the opposite of the above. This portrays a widening trade gap, which 
explains why France and Italy are major commercial creditors of Cuba. Another salient 
change is the well known shift to Venezuela as an oil supplier, perhaps with some 
triangulation with Russia, and with participation from Colombia. Spain continues to 
expand its overall dominance, while principally Mexico, and to a lesser degree Canada, 
and much less the Netherlands, continue to contract. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, “The Present Condition and the Rebuilding of the Cuban Economy: in 
Antonio Jorge and Jorge Salazar-Carrillo, eds., The Economics of the Caribbean: Present and Future 
Trends, Stockholm University, 1997. 
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Table 5 
Exports by Country of Destination for Principal Trading Partners 
 
N.A.= Not Available 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2003, 
Washington D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 1989 1995 2001 2002
Finland 18 N.A. N.A. N.A.
France 61 57 38 43
Germany 21 36 31 29
Italy 45 53 14 15
Netherlands 26 42 279 305
Portugal 23 24 18 19
Russia N.A. 196 435 288
Spain 91 96 119 152
United Kingdom 56 13 17 12
China 229 215 114 116
Japan 133 89 37 28
Brazil 32 N.A. 11 14
Canada 52 234 234 207
Mexico 21 6 28 24
Venezuela 26 2 N.A. 5
Algeria 81 N.A. 1 11
Libya 3 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Totals 918 1063 1376 1268
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Table 6 
Imports by Country of Origin for Principal Trading Partners 
 1989 1995 2001 2002
Belgium/Luxembourg 35 N.A. N.A. N.A.
France  49 148 221 198
Germany 124 70 91 73
Italy 81 81 250 237
Netherlands 38 71 66 58
Russia N.A. N.A. 64 34
Spain 216 395 559 447
United Kingdom 87 30 19 17
China 212 146 332 310
Japan 54 19 27 26
Argentina 187 N.A. 49 22
Brazil 62 N.A. 112 74
Canada 132 200 231 160
Colombia 27 18 24 62
Mexico 108 353 175 130
Venezuela 15 38 N.A. 305
Total 1427 1569 2220 2153
N.A.= Not Available 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2003, 
Washington D.C. 
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The Future of Cuban Trade AFTER  Communism 
 
Services 
 
Air Transportation: 
An additional 5 to 7 million tourists may be expected to travel to Cuba. Most of them 
from the US, many of them Cuban Americans, some of which may go to visit relatives 
and friends. This would benefit Cubana de Aviacion that transported 28% of all 
international visitors to Cuba in 1998.  
 
Maritime: 
The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 has increased shipping costs to Cuba by 23%, 
and deters many vessels of foreign shipping lines from docking in Cuban ports. With 
resumption of US - Cuba trade, several of Cuba’s ports would probably focus their 
operations on the export of goods from Cuba to the East coast of the US 
 
Banking and Insurance Services: 
In the absence of US sanctions, US banks and insurers would most likely concentrate on 
offering services to other foreign investors in Cuba, competing with banks and insurance 
firms from Europe and Canada. Cuba has no specific policies that prohibit foreign firms, 
as opposed to domestic Cuban firms, from participating in the Cuban market. However, 
because no privately owned banks or insurance firms are permitted in the domestic 
market, foreign firms are effectively excluded from most of the country, although they 
are able to form joint ventures with Cuban firms.  
In the absence of sanctions, similar banking and insurance company joint venture 
opportunities may be available to US firms, although such opportunities may be limited 
given the small size of the Cuban economy, and the established presence of foreign 
competitors 
The Cuban economy as a whole would also be expected to benefit from the addition of 
foreign competition, particularly in the insurance sector, leading to lower insurance costs 
throughout the country.  
 
Construction Services: 
The small size and capacity of the Cuban construction services industry make it unlikely 
that the US construction services industry would face competition from Cuba. Maybe 
some US construction firms would seek to enter into joint ventures with the new Cuban 
government.  
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Telecommunication Services: 
US calls to Cuba are likely to increase to 160 million minutes, an increase of 40 million 
minutes annually. Cuban calls to the US are likely to increase to 3.4 million minutes, an 
increase of 1.3 million minutes annually. 
Based on the current settlement payment of 60 cents a minute for calls originating in the 
US, these increases would result in additional revenues for Cuba ranging between $15-
$30 million annually. 
 
Travel and Tourism Services: 
Despite US sanctions, Cuba has outperformed the majority of other Caribbean 
destinations in terms of rate of growth in visitor arrivals in recent years, because of a low 
starting point.  
Cuba could experience a surge in visitors, increasing the total number of tourists within a 
decade to 5 million to 7 million annually. Some US sources estimate that Cuba’s need for 
additional hotel rooms could increase by more than 90% within 4 years, and by more than 
another 100% in an additional 4 years.  
 
Agriculture 
 
Meat and Dairy: 
The historical impact of US sanctions on Cuba’s meat and dairy has been small in terms 
of Cuban production, costs, and employment, because after sanctions were imposed, 
Cuba found alternate suppliers, including Canada (beef and pork), the European Union 
(E.U.) (chicken and dairy), and Brazil (chicken). However, they resulted in a small 
increase in Cuba’s import costs. The US will supply these products after the transition. 
Wheat: 
Prior to sanctions, Cuba imported about 200,000 metric tons of wheat annually from the 
US. From the 60’s to the late 80’s, the Soviet Bloc countries supplied wheat and wheat 
flour to Cuba, much of which was heavily subsidized or provided in countertrade for 
Cuban sugar at favorable prices. During the 80’s Cuba imported as much as 1 million 
metric tons annually of wheat and wheat flour. Until the end of the Soviet bloc the impact 
of sanctions were small.  
Cuba is likely to import wheat from the US. Cuban annual wheat imports were about 
780,000 metric tons in recent years, and imports from the US could amount to roughly 
400,000 metric tons, valued at $34 million to $52 million annually. 
Rice: 
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Prior to the 60’s Cuba imported around 200,000 metric tons of rice annually, mostly from 
the US. Cuban rice imports from the US would total between $40 million and $59 
million, representing 60% of all Cuban rice imports. Cuban imports of US rice stand to 
increase in the long run. Local production should increase concomitantly, to replace the 
other imports. 
Feedgrain: 
Cuba probably would import feedgrain, particularly corn, from the US, rather than from 
some more distant suppliers. The US could supply more than 90% of Cuban feedgrain 
imports, estimated to total $9 million to $10 million annually. The availability of 
feedgrain is likely to encourage expansion of poultry and hogs in the Island, so that total 
Cuban consumption of feedgrain would rise even further over time.  
Animal Feed: 
The quantity of Cuban feed grains, vegetable meals, supplements, and premixes that 
could be combined in Cuban feed mills would most likely improve through greater US 
exports of these products. Cuba could annually import between $39 million and $44 
million of animal feed in the absence of sanctions. 
Fats and Oils: 
In the short run, total Cuban fats and oils imports would remain unchanged, although the 
US would probably supply the majority (80 to 90 percent) of these imports. In the long 
run, lower-priced US fats and oils would likely increase total consumption.  
Dry Beans: 
Cuba is estimated to import between 20 and 40% of its total dry bean imports from the 
US in the near term, representing about $13 million to $26 million annually. Cuban 
imports of dry beans would be likely to increase in the long run. The Cuban dry bean 
industry is likely to be only minimally affected by the increased imports, because 
increased consumption would probably mitigate any impact.  
Winter Vegetables: 
Cuba was a significant overall supplier of winter vegetables, particularly tomatoes and 
cucumbers, to the US market prior to the sanctions. Cuban production would remain low, 
and exports of fresh winter vegetables to the US market probably would take several 
years to develop.  
Tropical Fruit: 
The US was a major consumer of tropical fruits exported from Cuba. With the loss of the 
US market, Cuban exports were redirected mainly to the Soviet Union and Europe.  
Citrus Fruits: 
US imports of citrus from Cuba would total $9 million to $23 million annually, based on 
1996-98 trade data, or 20 to 50 percent of Cuba’s exports. However, it is likely that 
several years would be needed before fresh Cuban citrus would be cleared by USDA as 
meeting US phytosanitary requirements. US investment in the Cuban citrus industry will 
result in the introduction of improved technology, management expertise, research, and 
availability of basic inputs. This investment would more likely be by large US juice 
processors than by smaller companies or growers, particularly large Brazilian juice 
processors with operations in Florida.  
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Sugar: 
Cuba was the world’s largest exporter of sugar, accounting for 33% of total world sugar 
exports in 1959. Sugar exports contributed to 25% of Cuba’s national income and more 
than 80% of its total export revenue.  
The effects of the Cuban sugar industry would depend on the type of trading arrangement 
agreed upon between the two countries: whether Cuba would be granted quota access to 
the US sugar market, and upon the quantity of access granted.  
 
Distilled Spirits: 
The large and lucrative US market for distilled spirits would be open to exports from 
Cuba. Cuban rum exports to the US could be between $15 million and $25 million, but 
over the longer term, exports could significantly exceed this amount.  
Cigars:  
Cuban cigars would benefit significantly from access to the US market. The likely impact 
would be an increase in investment in Cuban production of both premium hand-rolled 
cigars and machine-made, lower-cost cigars that could compete in the huge US market. 
However, Cuba must address serious production constraints, notably low yields of cigar 
tobacco, before output could be substantially increased.  
Seafood: 
Access to the US market would raise revenues to the Cuban industry by raising prices, 
not by enabling an increase in the volume sold, although trade may be diverted from 
output currently marketed in Japan and Europe. US imports from Cuba could amount to 
$5 million to $11 million annually, representing 5% to 10% of Cuba’s seafood exports, 
but only 0.3 to 0.5 percent of total US seafood imports.  
 
Intermediate and Manufactured Goods 
 
Fertilizer and pesticide products: 
As a net importing country of both fertilizers and pesticides, access to the US market in 
the absence of sanctions would provide some benefits, in particular the ability to import 
some products at lower cost than from other parts of the world.  
 
Pharmaceutical Products: 
Cuba could benefit if US and Cuba biotechnology companies develop joint ventures. This 
could eventually increase Cuban pharmaceutical and biotechnological exports to many 
third-party countries. Some US pharmaceutical firms might establish low-cost 
manufacturing operations in Cuba, similar to operations established in other Caribbean 
and South American countries. If production operations were established, US-Cuban 
trade in pharmaceuticals would increase, consisting largely of the intracompany 
shipments of intermediates and active ingredients. If manufacturing facilities for generic 
products were established, the products would probably be shipped to other countries in 
the Caribbean.  
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Textiles and Apparel Industries: 
Cuban exports of textiles and apparel to the US could be $500,000 to $1 million annually, 
representing about 10 to 15 percent of Cuba’s total exports to the world. Meanwhile, 
Cuba could import $6 million to $9 million of textile and apparel products from the US 
annually, representing 10 to 15 percent of total Cuban textile and apparel imports.  
 
Steel: 
The commission estimates that Cuban steel exports to the United States could reach $11 
million annually in the absence of sanctions, based on average 1996-98 trade data, 
representing as much as 25 percent of total Cuban steel exports. Imports of steel from the 
US are expected to be less than $1 million per year.  
 
Nickel and Cobalt: 
According to industry sources, suppliers of Cuban-sourced nickel and cobalt would be 
able to sell their products in the large, stable US market in the absence of sanctions, 
avoiding the need to absorb price discounts for their products in certain markets. Such a 
development would also encourage financing of mining projects in Cuba, thus serving to 
eliminate the current cost premium associated with Cuban mining projects and potentially 
increase Cuba’s production, sales and employment in this sector. Future investment in 
Cuba is likely to be accelerated because of the prospective lowering of operating and 
capital costs for Cuban mining projects that would result from access to the US market. 
 
Machinery and Transportation Equipment: 
Machinery: Cuban imports of machinery from the US would total $120 million to $154 
million annually, representing 35 to 45 percent of total Cuban machinery imports.  
Transportation Equipment: Cuban imports of transportation equipment from the US 
would total $43 million to $55 million annually, or 35 to 45 percent of total Cuban 
imports of these products.  
 
Power Generation Machinery and Equipment: 
Major obstacles to trade and investment would remain in the Cuban energy sector. 
Among these principally the need for further development of Cuba’s hydrocarbon 
resources, and the need for establishing a regulatory framework conducive to attracting 
electric power generators and suppliers.  
 
Electronics Goods: 
Electronics goods exports from Cuba are minimal and are not technologically 
competitive with US manufactured equipment or with most US imports. US exports to 
Cuba are expected to be substantial. 
 
Medical Goods: 
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An increase in imports from the US would probably displace European and Asian 
suppliers rather than Cuban producers, since foreign suppliers account for nearly 90 
percent of Cuban consumption. 
 
Cement: 
Cuban cement exports to the United States would total between $19 million and $24 
million annually, representing 75 to 95 percent of total Cuban cement exports, assuming 
column 1-general rates of duty. If column –2 rates apply, Cuba is still likely to export to 
the US market, but at slightly reduced levels. It is anticipated that opening the US market 
to Cuban cement would also generate opportunities for US investment in Cuba that 
would improve cement production efficiency. For example, the Puerto Rican cement 
company that operated a plant in Cuba during the 1950’s, has reportedly stated that it 
intends to return to the Cuban market. 
 
Plastics: 
The Cuban plastics industry does not compete in world markets. Nearly all plastics 
production in Cuba is consumed internally.  
 
Tires: 
The US industry might expect to gain 65 to 75 percent of total imports, representing $21 
million to $25 million.  
 
Sporting Goods: 
Cuban sporting goods have had difficulty competing in global markets with US and 
European brands.  
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Appendix 
 
A Reconstruction of Cuban Trade Patterns 
 
Based on Historical Records 
 
 
 Although the Handbook used to explore Cuban trade patterns is only concerned 
about recent trade, a publication of the International Monetary Fund has covered inter-
country commerce for many years. The publication is the Direction of Trade and it is 
published in Washington, D.C.. First it was a supplement to that organization’s 
International Financial Statistics, published originally as an annual covering several 
years. Later it became a stand-alone Yearbook. Lately, it also comes out as a quarterly 
periodical. As in the Central Intelligence Agency’s publication, the statistics reflect the 
value of trade in nominal (not adjust for inflation) US $. However, this source is not as 
complete, detailed and reliable as the Handbook for the 1990s, while being largely 
consistent with it, particularly if trade with the former Soviet Bloc is excluded. 
 
 In Appendix Table 1 the exports of Cuba, by country of destination are shown for 
the years 1958 to 1962. The most remarkable figures in the table have to do with total 
exports, which drop from 732 million US $ in 1958 to 402 million in 1962. This 
represents a drop of 45 percent in four years, which was less steep than the drop of 76 
percentage points between 1989 and 1993. The earlier drop was all accounted by the 
breaking of diplomatic relations with the United States, which brought about a drop of 
exports from Cuba of 484 million US $. The more recent decline has to be due to the 
change in economic system in the USSR. 
  
 In the main text it has been established that foreign trade statistics can be 
considered the most reliable instrumental variable for total GDP under the circumstances 
of statistics in Cuba during the 1989 –1993 time period. The same could be applied to the 
1958 – 1962 span, in which the statistical system of Cuba fell in total disarray. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the major trauma afflicting the Cuban economy during these 
crucial transition periods has probably constituted a substantial part of the process of 
immiserization suffered by the economy of the Island since the late fifties. It is interesting 
to note that the estimated shrinkage in the GDP of the country that would parallel the 
export drops were more serious in the 1990s. The explanation will be amplified below, as 
it is noted that the USSR picked up an important share (almost fifty percent) of the export 
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loss to the United States of America. Unfortunately for the Cuban economy, no nation 
could play the same role in the early nineties.  
 
 If the direction of exports depicted in Appendix Table 1 are considered from a 
geographical standpoint, it seems clear that the US market was the bread and butter of 
Cuban exports in 1958 – 1960. After that it practically disappeared. The other major 
markets, Japan and the United Kingdom, represented about ten percent of the U.S. 
market. As mentioned before, the USSR geared up its agreement with the Island by 1960, 
taking then more than seven times the exports it had absorbed from Cuba in 1958. And 
more than doubled it again by 1993. It should be noted that Canada and Spain, and much 
less Mexico and China, did not represent significant markets for Cuban exports, and that 
they were contracting during this time frame. 
 
 On Appendix Table 2 data are presented corresponding to Cuban imports from the 
rest of the world from 1958 to 1962. The contraction in imports is of 3615 percent 
between these years, smaller than the one it exports, but still a damaging blow to any 
open economy, which Cuba clearly was then16. The rate of decline of U.S. imports to the 
nation was more or less in line with what happened on the export side. But with respect to 
the USSR, the build up of imports was even faster than what happened on the other side 
of the ledger. The former Soviet Union had small imports into the Cuban economy in 
1958 and 1959, and by 1961 was supplying more imports to the Island, than the latter 
imported from the USA in 1960, when political ties had not been broken still. By 1962 it 
was shipping 371 million US $ in goods to Cuba.  
 
 The principal sources of goods to the economy of Cuba before the advent of 
Castro Communism, of course after the United States by far, were Venezuela, the United 
Kingdom and Western Germany. It is interesting to note that the former country, a Latin 
American one, was the second largest trading partner of Cuba, representing 12 percent of 
total US supplies to Cuba in that year, basically in terms of oil imports. These countries 
rapidly vanished towards zero by the end of 1962 (with Eastern Germany substituting its 
inferior exports for those previously supplied by Bonn). It is also noteworthy that Poland 
had become a significant trader with Cuba, actually its second largest source of imports 
by 1962. Again the major exporters to Cuba these days Spain, China and Italy were not 
significant ones in the early sixties, and suffered severe contractions in their Cuban 
imports during this period (particularly noticeable with Spanish imports). Which suggests 
that these countries have built a trade relationship with Cuba on the basis of opportunism, 
and not in terms of being natural trading partners with the Island (which in contract 
Venezuela could easily be). 
 
                                                 
15 The drop in imports between 1989 and 1993 was of 75 percent, almost the same as in exports. Therefore, 
Cuba was able to soften more its decline in imports during the earlier period.  
16 It should be noted that the Cuban economy was as open in 1989 as it was thirty one years earlier. This is 
not only evident from comparing the estimates at both ends of the time span, but also realizing that Cuba 
became a provider of the same goods to the Soviet Union (and later the CMEA) that it used to supply to the 
United States, and imported practically the same goods from one and the other. The Island never embarked, 
unlike its Latin American sister nations, in a process of import-substituting industrialization. 
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 Unfortunately the IMF statistical sources, which internationally are considered the 
most reliable, do not provide a breakdown of foreign trade by type of good. The next 
alternative source providing these data are the United Nations various Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics published during the year 1958 to 1962. The problem with 
the latter source mainly stem from the acceptance of statistical data supplied by the 
member countries, without adjusting and checking them to assure consistency with the 
flows reported by their trade partners. It is here that the Direction of Trade Statistics stand 
out. 
 
 Nevertheless, in Appendix Table 3 and 4 an attempt is made to provide order of 
magnitude of the patterns of commodity exports and imports in the Island. The relative 
shares in question are less affected by the distortions in the absolute numbers that the 
Yearbooks probably bear. Turning first to exports, it is evident that Appendix Table 3 
depicts a country that is a textbook case of a monoculture. If anything, the traditional 
dependence on sugar and its byproducts for Cuba’s foreign exchange earnings was 
exaggerated somewhat by 1962, with almost 83 percent of exports attributable to these 
items. In contract with other developing countries of the world, by 1989 the nation’s 
export earnings were still so heavily concentrated on sugar products (73.4 percent) that 
the economy of Cuba had to be considered one of the most dependent on a single product 
export. So much can be said of an economy by examining its structure of commerce, that 
it is clear that the diversification, industrialization and branching into services 
characteristic of economic growth had not occurred in the Cuban economy just before the 
demise of the Soviet Communist Bloc.  
 
 Turning now to imports, shown on Appendix Table 4, it can be seen that the 
importation of machinery was about as important in 1989 as in 1958, with the former 
year’s import share being somewhat higher (23.7 percent). The same was the case for 
transport equipment which in 1989 represented 7.5% of total imports. In contrast to the 
transition from a market oriented to a command economy between 1958 and 1962, in 
which the investment of imports did not suffer, the most recent reversal from the 
communist system to free world trade has seen a plunge in the participation of capital 
goods imports to levels about half those of 1989 in machinery (12.7 percent in 1995) and 
less than that for transports (3.5 percent in 1995). It should be noted, to wit, that the 
previous years of the 1990s were even lower. Thus it is evident that the disruption 
suffered by the economy in question in its recent transition has been more damaging than 
the one in the early sixties, and that several years of low investment will compromise its 
ability to grow for the next seven or eight year. Unless, of course, there are substantial 
amounts of aid and subsidized lending that would come forth.  
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Appendix Table 1 
Exports by Country of Destination, 1958-62 
(in millions of US$) 
 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Total 732 638 630 486 402
US & 
Canada 507 455 364 40 9
United 
States 491 445 357 35 7
United 
Kingdom 37 9 20 15 20
France 8 9 13 1 2
Germany 
(Bonn) 7 14 9 2 6
Italy 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 16 17 12 4 4
Spain 18 6 10 9 9
USSR 14 13 104 312 234
Germany  4 12 
Poland  10 24 19
Brazil 1 4 3  
Colombia 3 2 1  
Mexico 1 1 1 1 
Venezuela 3 9 1 1 
Neth 
Antilles 7 6 1 1 1
Trinidad 1 1  
Near East 
Asia   
Syria 3 2 5 5 4
Africa 13 14 22 7 23
Morocco 12 13 19 7 22
Japan 47 28 18 24 36
China 4 1  
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Appendix Table 2 
Imports by Country of Destination, 1958-62 
(in millions of US$) 
 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
Total 777 692 470 514 496
US & 
Canada 561 453 357 46 24
United 
States 491 445 236 35 7
United 
Kingdom 22 43 21 13 7
France 77 14 11 6 2
Germany 
(Bonn) 24 30 14 12 6
Italy 11 8 5 4 1
Netherlands 7 8 8 11 8
Spain 13 8 10 4 1
USSR  71 338 391
Germany  3 28 
Poland  4 23 20
Brazil 2 1 1 1 1
Colombia 1 2 1  
Mexico 6 2 1 3 1
Venezuela 66 56 28 1 3
Neth 
Antilles 3 9 5 4 4
Trinidad 1  
Near East 
Asia   
Syria   
Africa 1 2 1 3 5
Morocco 1 2 3 5
Japan 4 10 6 12 11
China      
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Appendix Table 3 
Commodity Exports, 1958 and 1962 in percentages 
 1958 1962 
Sugar/molasses and honey 80.1 82.9 
Fruits and vegetables 0.0 1.2 
Tobacco 6.7 4.8 
Nickel and other metals 3.8 7.3 
Textiles and apparel 1.2 0.8 
Other 7.9 0.3 
 
Source: United Nation, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, several years, New 
York. 
+ Percentages may not add to 100.00 because of rounding 
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Appendix Table 4 
Commodity Imports, 1958 and 1962 percentages 
 1958 1962 
Food 14.4 23.3 
Raw materials 9.6 5.7 
Fuels 12.9 11.6 
Chemical products 4.8 9.5 
Semi-finished goods 10.5 21.9 
Machinery 19.2 16.7 
Transport Equipment 6.9 9.5 
Commercial other goods 21.7 2.0 
Source: United Nations, ibid. 
+ Percentage may not add to 100.00 because of rounding 
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